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PRIORITY CONTESTS INVOLVING DEEDS OF TROST AFTER
BAOSMAN V. HAOSMAN

by Lynda L. Butler
On March 6, 1987, the Virginia Supreme Court announced its shocking decision in
Hausman v. Hausman, 233 Va. - ' 3 VLR 1835 (Mar. 6, 1987). The case involved a
priority contest between a bank holding a recorded deed of trust executed by only one
tenant by the entirety and an ex-spouse with a judgment lien for child support. In
deciding that the judgment lien had priori ty over the deed of trust, the Court reached a
decision that appears to upset prior law or at least accepted interpretations of that law.
This article explores some of the problems raised by the Hausman decision.
The Controversy in Hausman
Under the facts in Hausman, husband and wife acquired realty as tenants by the
entirety. Subsequently, after husband and wife separated, husband alone executed a deed
of trust on the entirety property to secure a loan made by a bank. The bank recorded the
deed of trust shortly after its execution. A few months later, husband and wife were
divorced and wife received a judgment for child support. About a week after the divorce
decree was entered, wife docketed the support judgment, creating a lien against
husband's real estate.
Two days after entry of the divorce decree, husband filed an action seeking a
partition of the entirety property. The bank intervened, and the action was referred to a
commissioner in chancery. The commissioner concluded that the support judgment had
priority over the bank's deed of trust. The commissioner reasoned that the deed of
trust's effectiveness depended on the entry of the divorce decree. Because that decree
granted the support judgment, the judgment had priority over the deed of trust.
The trial court overruled the commissioner's findings, holding that the deed of
trust had priority over the support judgment. The trial court apparently accepted the
bank's argument that its lien attached to the husband's interest in the property when the
divorce decree severed the entireties interest and that when the support judgment was
recorded almost a week later the bank's lien was prior in time and therefore superior.
Wif e then appealed to the Virginia Suprem e Court.
The Decision of the Virginia Supreme Court
On appeal, the Virginia Suprem e Court reversed the trial court and held instead
that the child support judgment had priority over the bank's deed of trust. In reaching
this decision, the Court first defined the effectiveness of the husband's deed of trust at
the time of its execution. According to the Court, "[w] hen spouses hold ti tle to property
in fee simple as tenants by the entirety, neither spouse can convey any part of the
property by his or her sole act." 3 VLR at 1836. Thus, "[a]n effort on the part of one
spouse, acting alone, to create a lien against entirety property creates no lien at all." Id.
at 1837.
Having concluded that the deed of trust did not create a lien when executed, the
Court then focused on the effectiveness of the deed of trust upon entry of the divorce
decree. The bank had argued that once the decree was entered its deed of trust became
a viable lien under the estoppel by deed or after-acquired property doctrine. As codified
in secti on 55-52 of the Virginia Code, that doctrine provides:
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When a deed purports to convey property, real or personal,
describing it with reasonable certainty, which the grantor does
not own at the ti me of the execution of the deed, but
subsequently acquires, such deed shal], as between the parties
thereto, ha ve the sam e effect as if the ti tle which the grantor
subsequently acquires were vested in him at the time of the
execution of such deed and thereby conveyed. Any such deed,
which shall have been executed by the consort of the grantor,
shall bar the contingent right of dower or curtesy of such
consort of the grantor therein.
Va. Code § 55-52 (1986). Under the bank's argument, its lien outranked the support
judgment lien because the judgment was not docketed until almost a week after entry of
the divorce decree.
In rejecting the bank's argument, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that the
bank misconstrued the estoppel by deed or after-acquired doctrine found in section 5552. More specifically, the bank's interpretation "ignore[d)" the statutory language which
clarifies that the doctrine only applies "as between the parties thereto." 3 VLR at 183738. As the Court explained, section 55-52 prevents "the grantor from denying that title
has actually passed to the grantee. Thus, as between the parties, the statute permits the
passage of title." Id. at 1838. The statute, however, does not affect or "prejudice the
rights of third parties." Id
In the instant case, then, the third party interest, the judgment lien, had priority
over the section 55-52 interest, the deed of trust. In the words of the Court, the bank's
deed of trust was "void as to ••• [the wife] and the children." Id.
The Uncertainty of Hausman
The Court's decision in Hausman raises numerous questions and problems. At the
very least, the decision upsets settled expectations and understandings about the priori ty
rules governing mortgage or deed of trust liens. In addi tion, the decision creates
considerable uncertainty about the effectiveness of such liens. Most of the uncertainty
arises from the Court's failure to define more precisely and comprehensively the bases of
its de cision.
Several readings of the Court's decision in Hausman are plausible, depending on
the interpretation given various parts of the opinion. See J. Madison, B. Madison &. D.
Rendleman, 1987 Supplement to Enforcement of Judgments and Liens in Virginia § 4.4, at
39-40 (1987). One possibili ty is to interpret Hausman primarily as an estoppel by deed or
after-acquired property case. This approach reads Hausman as requiring a party wi th a
section 55-52 interest in realty to record the interest after the party's grantor
subsequently acquires the property in order for the party's interest to be effective
against third parties. Under the first approach, the bank's deed of trust would remain
ineffective against third parties, even after the divorce decree was entered, until the
bank rerecorded the deed of trust.
A second possibility focuses on the nature of tenancy by the entirety property and
the impact of a divorce decree on that property. This approach interprets Hausman as
limiting the effect of a divorce decree on entirety property. The divorce decree would
not effectively sever the tenancy by the entirety against parties other than the husband
and wife until the decree was recorded.
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A third possibility focuses on the nature of a divorce action. This approach
interprets Hausman as applying the relation back doctrine to a spouse's recording of a
divorce decree, allowing that recording to relate back to the date of the decree. Under
this interpretation the Court in Hausman would, in effect, be giving the wife a grace
period wi thin which to record the divorce decree.
All three interpretations could have far-reaching implications. To an extent,
those implications would appear to be more limited for the second and third
interpretations than the first approach. Because the second and third approaches focus
on the nature of entirety property and a divorce action, not all section 55-52 interests
would be affected by those approaches to the Hausman decision. Only section 55-52
mortgage liens in entirety property could be affected, and then only if the mortgage is
executed by one spouse and the tenants by the entirety subsequently divorce. In
contrast, the first interpretation would appear to prevent all section 55-52 interests from
being effective against third parties, regardless of whether the interest is held in
entirety property, until after the party granting the interest actually acquires the
property and the grantee then records.
On the other hand, the first reading permi ts a party with a section 55-52 interest
in entirety property to acquire priority over liens arising from a divorce decree if the
party records after the divorce decree is entered but before it is docketed. The other
two interpretations, however, would never permit a party with a section 55-52 interest in
entirety property to acquire priori ty over a support judgment lien. Under the second
interpretation, a section 55-52 interest in entirety property could not possibly become
effective tmtil the di vorce decree was recorded; the divorce decree would not effectively
sever the entirety interest for third parties until recordation of the decree. Further,
under the third approach, the recording of the divorce decree would relate back to the
date of the decree, thus preventing the section 55-52 interest from ever being prior in
time to the support judgment lien.
Whether the Court in Hausman intended any of the three interpretations is
difficult to determine. On the one hand, the Court focuses on the nature of entirety
property in defining the effectiveness of the deed of trust. On the other hand, the
Court's treatment of the after-acquired doctrine suggests that that doctrine was crucial
to the Court's decision. Particularly persuasive is the Court's conclusion that the
doctrine did not apply to the bank's deed of trust and that therefore the bank's interest
was "void" as to the wife and children.
But regardless of the approach taken, the Court's decision, especially its
treatment of the after-acquired doctrine, raises serious questions about its interpretation
and applica tion of Virginia law. Som e of those questi ons are discussed now.
Mistakes of Interpretation
In reaching its decision to give priority to the judgment lien, the Court in
Hausman appears to commit several mistakes in interpreting and applying Virginia law.
In particular, the Court appears to interpret incorrectly the estoppel by deed doctrine,
which forms the basis of section 55-52. Courts of equity developed that doctrine to
protect a party when he was conveyed property by a grantor who did not own the
property at the time of conveyance. When the grantor subsequently acquired the same
property, courts applied the estoppel by deed doctrine to conclude that the grantor's
interest automatically inured to the benefit of the grantee. It only seemed fair to estop
the grantor from denying that the property passed at the time of the conveyance to the
grantee. See generally R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck &. D. Whitman, The Law of Property
§ 1l.5 (I 984).
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If the grantor, after acquiring the title, conveys it to a second grantee, the
question then becomes whether the estoppel by deed doctrine should be applied against
the second grantee as well. Most courts have concluded that the doctrine should be
restricted to the immediate parties to the original conveyance and should not be applied
to subsequent purchasers, at least not when they are innocent. See ide A few courts,
however, have adopted a contrary approach, concluding that a subsequent purchaser also
may be estopped under the doctrine. See, ~ Ayer v. Philadelphia & Boston Face Brick
Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N.E. 177 (1893). This approach, in effect, expands the scope of a
title search: to discover an estoppel by deed situation, a third party contemplating a
purchase must adverse or search for conveyances by parties in his potential chain of ti tle
prior to the ti me that they had record ti tle.

In section 55-52, the Virginia General Assembly included language that defines the
effect of the estoppel by deed doctrine only "as between the parties thereto." By
including this language, the legislature has indicated that it is following the majority
approach in deciding not to apply the doctrine to third parties. But, just because the
doctrine does not apply to third parties, it does not necessarily follow that the interest of
the first grantee is void as against third parties. Other legal prinCiples could
nevertheless give the first grantee's interest priority over the interests of a third party.
Most notably, the principles governing recordation of documents would seem to be
relevant to such priori ty suits. One of these principles can be found in section 55-96 of
the Virginia Code, which sets forth Virginia's recording statute. Under that statute, the
inquiry of a court following the majority approach to estoppel by deed should be whether
the third party is a subsequent purchaser who took without notice of the adverse claim of
the first grantee. See Va. Code § 55-96 (I986); see also R. Minor, The Law of Real
Property § 1255 (2d ed. 1928). Usually a subsequent purchaser should not be on record
notice of such a claim because the majority approach limits the adversing process of a
title search to the time a party is record owner of the property and the first grantee's
deed will look like a wild deed that is outside the chain of title. Accord R. Cunningham,
W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, supra, S 11.5. But in the context of entirety property and
Hausman, a subsequent third party purchaser clearly would be on record notice of the
first grantee's interest in the entirety property. Even if the first grantee recorded that
interest prior to the time that his grantor actually acquired a title that he could transfer,
that recording still would have occurred after the grantor became a record owner of the
entirety property. From the records, then, a subsequent purchaser could discover the
adverse claim of the first grantee and should not be protected under the recording
statute.
Another principle of recordation relevant to priori ty sui ts involving an estoppel by
deed situation is section 55-105 of the Virginia Code. That section provides that a
purchaser shall not be "affected •.• by the record of a deed or contract made by any
person under whom the title of such purchase is derived, if it was made by such person
before he acquired the legal title of record." Va. Code § 55-105 (1986). Although this
section appears, on its face, to support the Court's decision in Hausman, the section
apparently was intended to adopt the chain-of-title reasoning used above to resolve the
priority conflict between the first grantee and a subsequent purchaser. See R.
Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whi tman, supra, § 11.5 at n.27. The section also clarifies
that the adversing process of a ti tle search is to be limited and does not include
conveyances made by a party prior to the time he became record owner. See R. Minor,
supra, § 1255, at 1691. At least in the context of Hausman and entirety property, the
chain-of-title reasoning would lead to a different result since the conveyance to the first
grantee would be in the grantor's chain of title. Further, section 55-105 appears to
protect purchasers only, and not creditors. See ide § 1319, at 1795.
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Thus, in addi tion to problems of uncertainty, the Hausman decision also raises
problems of interpretation. One such problem concerns the Court's incorrect
interpretation of the estoppel by deed doctrine and its implications for language used in
section 55-52. Another closely related problem concerns the Court's failure to consider
Virginia's recording principles. Instead of ignoring those principles, the Court should
have realized that the priority contest between the bank's deed of trust and the judgment
lien ulti mately became a recording act matter.
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